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INTRODUCTION

I

nformation stored in a physical object receives the same Fourth
1
Amendment protection as the phy~ical object in which it is stored.
As information moves online, it becomes independent of physical
objects, and therefore traditional rules must be reexamined. Others
have argued persuasively/ and courts appear receptive to the
argument,3 that online communications and data should receive the
same protection as their analogs embodied in the physical world.
Even assuming that this conclusion will be universally accepted, a
troubling consequence remains: the clear weight of authority holds
that Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to information
embodied in discarded physical trash. 4 If this rule for discarded
physical trash translates into cyberspace, then even if online
communications and data are protected, "cybertrash"-deleted emails and other files-is not protected.

1 See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence
and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (2005).
2 See, e.g., David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth
Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN.
L. REv. 2205 (2009); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
72 OEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557 (2004).
3 E.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86 (6th Cir. 2010); In re United
States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210,1213 (D. Or. 2009).
4 While Couillard and Mulligan conclude that undeleted files are protected, Couillard,
supra note 2; Mulligan, supra note 2, "undiscarded trash" is also protected, but loses its
protection when discarded, see infra Part II.
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This Article begins with a summary of the development of Fourth
Amendment theory and the evolution of its theoretical basis from
protection of property against physical trespass to protection of
individuals against violations of their expectation of privacy5 The
Article then analyzes the application. of theory to the special case of
physical trash. 6 The Article next explores what is meant by trash by
looking at the broader context of disposal of physical materials and
comparing various legal models for rights in discarded materials?
Finally, the Article evaluates the models and concludes that
cybertrash is fundamentally different from physical trash and should
be accorded Fourth Amendment protection notwithstanding the denial
of such protection for physical trash. 8
I
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment is, of course, the starting point for any
analysis of protection against search and seizure. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly descrbbing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The theory underlying the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment has evolved,IO running from a literal reading
applying the Fourth Amendment to "persons, houses,11 papers, and

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states by virtue
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) ("[E]vidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is ... inadmissible in a state court.").
10 For a detailed analysis of the development of Fourth Amendment interpretation, see
Madeline A. Herdrich, Note, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of Privacy, 38 AM.
U. L. REv. 993 (1989). For an analysis of the confusion caused by the Supreme Court's
different tests, see David P. Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and
Fourth Amendment Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709 (1977).
II Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (denying protection to open fields);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (denying protection to telephone lines
running to a house).
5

6
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effects" to an expectation of privacy test. 12 Running throughout this
evolution is the common thread of protection of privacy and dignity
interests against arbitrary and invasive acts by the government. 13
However, the meaning of "invasive" has historically evolved in
response to technological advances, and technological changes have
been dramatic since the Supreme Court's most recent venture into
Fourth Amendment theory. I
A. The Physical Trespass Theory

Early Fourth Amendment cases were property based and held that
the Fourth Amendment only prohibited searches that involved a
common-law trespass by government officials. 15 A corollary, the
"open fields" doctrine, which was applied in Hester v. United
States, 16 was based on a reading of the Fourth Amendment as literally
limited to people, houses, papers, and effects, and not to open fields
beyond the home. 17 This reading relied on the common-law
distinction between "curtilage," which had been "traditionally defined
as the protected area immediately surrounding the home, into which
[the] intimate activities [of the home were] extended," and "open
fields," which implicated more relaxed rules oftresp~ss.18
The Supreme Court did not perceive defining the limits of the
curtilage as difficult. In Oliver v. United States, the Court noted:

12 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) ("[AJ fundamental purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from unreasonable government invasions
of legitimate privacy interests, and not simply those interests found inside the four walls of
the home." (footnote omitted»; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967)
("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." (citation omitted».
13 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
14 The most recent detailed exploration of Fourth Amendment theory was in the 1967
case, Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-59, discussed infra Part I.C.
15 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59; Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942)
(noting that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to open fields but does extend
to the area immediately surrounding the home).
16 265 U.S. at 59.
17 William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799; 828-29 (2000).
18 Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine
to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 299 (2005).
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Most of the many millions of acres that are "open fields" are not
close to any structure and so not arguably within the curtilage. And,
for most homes, the boundaries. of the curtilage will be clearly
marked; and the conception defining the curtilage-as the area
around the home to which the activity of home life extfJIds-is a
familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.

The Court offered the following refinement of the curtilage definition
in United States v. Dunn: the area that "is so intimately tied to the
home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of
Fourth Amendment protection.,,20 The definition is, of course,
circular; defining the curtilage as that area protected by the Fourth
Amendment is less than helpful in answering the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment applies. The Court did, however, list four
factors for determining whether an area was within the curtilage: (1)
proximity to the home, (2) whether the area was within an enclosure
surrounding the home, (3) the uses to which the area was put, and (4)
the steps taken to protect the area from observation by passersby.21
The Oliver and Dunn decisions predate the World Wide Web,22 so
. it is not surprising that the "familiar" conception of curtilage
23
supposed in those cases breaks down when applied to cyberspace
and that the four Dunn factors do not translate well to analysis of
cyberspace.

19

466 U.S. 170,182 n.12 (1984).
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
21 Id. at 302-03. For an analysis of the difficulty of applying the concept of curtilage to
high-density urban locations, see Leonetti, supra note 18.
22 A November 12, 1990, internal CERN (the European Organization for Nuclear
Research) memo from Tim Berners-Lee of its Computing and Network Division and R.
Cailliau of its Electronics and Computing for Physics Division is widely regarded as the
blueprint for what would become the World Wide Web. See T. Berners-Lee & R. Cailliau,
WorldWide Web: Proposal for a HyperText Project, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM,
http://www.w3.org/Proposal.html(last visited Aug. 5, 2011). The predecessor of the
Internet (Arpanet) already existed but was not widely available. Even the CERN plan for
the World Wide Web was, at that stage, limited: "The project will not aim ... to do
research into fancy multimedia facilities such as sound and video." Id. The first use of the
term "World Wide Web" occurred in October 1990. Dan Connolly, A Little History of the
World Wide Web, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.orglHistory.html (last
.
visited Aug. 5,2011).
20

23 The Court had, .of course, dealt with electronic extensions of the home in wiretapping
cases. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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In addition, an aspect of general trespass law is the principle that
there can be no trespass against abandoned property,24 an aspect that
25
features critically in the trash cases discussed below.
In the
physical world, abandonment requires "both [the] owner's intent to
abandon . . . property and . . . some affirmative act or omission
demonstrating that intention.,,26 The more challenging of these two
requirements is the finding of intent to abandon,27 a challenge that is
especially difficult in cyberspace.
B. Relaxation of the Physical Trespass Requirement
The transition of Fourth Amendment theory from trespass to
expectation of privacy began with the recognition that a narrow view
of what constituted a trespass translated into a broad scope for
warrantless searches.
In Silverman v. United States, the traditional requirement of a
physical trespass to trigger Fourth Amendment protection was relaxed
28
in response to technological advances.
Police had obtained
evidence by using an electronic listening device?9 The Court found
no physical trespass but invalidated the search as an intrusion on a
constitutionally protected area. 30 The approach is similar in theory to
that taken in United States v. Dunn, which, while involving physical
space, used language broadly defining curtilage as the area within
which "intimate activity associated with 'the sanctity of a man's home
31
and the privacies of life'" takes place.

24 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (upholding the warrantless seizure of
whiskey bottles dropped by the defendant during a police chase because the bottles were
abandoned).
25 See infra Part II.

Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 1131, 1138 (2d Cir. 1991).
Although intent may be inferred if supported by facts, 'Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221
U.S. 580, 597-98 (1911), it may also be defeated by facts showing that surrender of
possession was not accompanied by an intention to give up ownership, Saxlehner v. Eisner
. & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19,34-35 (1900).
26

27

28

365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).
29 Id. at 506.
30Id. at 511-12.
31 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) .(quoting Oliver. v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)); see also supra notes 20--21 and accompanying text. The core
language of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life" was taken from Boyd
v. United States, 166 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Courts have also recognized Fourth
Amendment protection in common areas within apartment complexes, hotels, and motels.
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Had the evolution of Fourth Amendment theory stopped there it
would be tempting to argue that the protected area of curtilage
extends be~ond physical space. Under this view, the rise of cloud
computing 2 could be seen as extending the traditional protection of
the physical home into cyberspace. David Couillard advances the
theoretical underpinning fof. recognition of this "virtual curtilage":
Modern Internet users enjoy access to digital calendars,
photographs, address books, correspondence in the form of e-mail
messages, and diaries in the form of personal blogs. Such a list of
items may sound familiar-it includes the same materials deemed
"highly personal" by the Supreme Court . . . . The fact that such
items are digital rather than p~sical should not change their status
as highly personal objects ....

This. status, Couillard argues, is sufficient to bring at least certain
Internet activities within the curtilage, which, before Katz v. United
States, would establish Fourth Amendment protection and, under
Katz, would be at least a factor supporting protection. 34
However, while the transitional case of Silverman and its progeny
still referred to concepts of trespass within the curtilage, the
connection became strained in later cases in the face of technological
advances that blurred the notions of trespass, the curtilage, and
physical reality itself. The strain ultimately became too great in Katz,
which abandoned the requirement of physical trespass theory as a
prerequisite to invoking Fourth Amendment protection and replaced it
with the current expectation of privacy test. 3

See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709,716-17 (9th Cir. 1976) (common hallway
of an apartment building); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976)
(common area of an apartment building); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir.
1974) (fenced yard of a multiunit apartment building). But see United States v. Holland,
755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985) (no expectation of privacy in common hallway or
lobby of an apartment building).
32 The term "cloud computing" arises from the use of a cloud icon as a symbol for the
Internet in flow charts. It refers to a system in which data and software are stored
remotely and accessed through the Internet rather than being located on the user's
computer. Google's Gmail service is an example of a widely used cloud-computing
application. See infra Part III.AA.
33 Couillard, supra note 2, at 2219-20 (footnotes omitted).
• 34 Id. at 2220.
35 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 3'60 (1967). Trespass may still be relevant
to the determination of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy under the current
Katz test. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 ("The existence ofa property right is but one element in
determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate."). For an example of
application by lower courts, see United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir.
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C. The Expectation of Privacy Theory
The expectation of privacy analysis was explicitly decoupled from
the concept of trespass within the curtilage in Katz v. United States. 36
In Katz, the area searched was nowhere near the defendant's home
and was not owned by the defendant-the challenged evidence was
obtained by wiretapping a public telephone booth. 37 The Court held
the evidence improperly obtained because "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places,,38 and what an individual "seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected," noting that the defendant had sought to
exclude "the uninvited ear.,,39
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion is frequently cited as the
clearer statement of the holding of the case: "My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold

2005) ("[T]he proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal property rights have
been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the [property] alleged to be abandoned. In making that determination, however,
it is still relevant to consider a defendant's property interest." (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For a further discussion of Katz and the
expectation of privacy theory, see infra Part' II.
36 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. For a detailed analysis of Katz and cases interpreting Katz," see
Herdrich, supra note 10, at 1000-06. For attempts to distill guidance from Katz, see James
A. Bush & Rece Bly, Note, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash
Reconnaissance After Katz v. United States, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 283, 287-88 (1981)
(identifying seven Katz factors: (I) defendant's own conduct, (2) strength of physical
barriers, (3) number of people with access, (4) number of people outside enclosure, (5)
social inhibitions, (6) sensory enhancing, and (7) defendant's control of enclosure), and
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging
Tripartite AnalysiS, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1987) (identifying three Katz factors:
(I) place of intrusion, (2) nature and degree of intrusion, and (3) object of surveillance); cf
Rosemarie Falcone, Note, California v. Ciraolo: The Demise of Private Property, 47 LA.
L. REv. 1365, 1371 (1987) (concluding that Katz provides no clear guidance).
37 389 U.S. at 348.

38Id. at 351. Concurring, Justice Harlan stated:
I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed
telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as
well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally
protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively
unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.

Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan's concurrence was ultimately adopted by
the Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
39Id. at 351-52.
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requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ",40
Not surprisingly, the focus in subsequent cases applying this twopronged expectation of privacy test has tended to lie on the second,
more objective prong of determining what society is willing to
41
respect.
In Oliver v. United States, police recovered marijuana plants from
an open field on which the defendant had posted a "No Trespassing"
sign.42 Under the classic trespass cases, the sign would have been
irrelevant-a search of open fields would have been viewed as
permissible. The Oliver Court reached the same conclusion, but
found it necessary to consider the effect of the "No Trespassing" sign.
Although recognizing that the sign evidenced the defendant's
personal desire for privacy, the Court held that society in general did
not recognize the privacy of open fields and therefore a warrantless
43
.
search was not improper.
The expectation of privacy theory recognizes a special case
comparable to the trespass theory's special case for abandoned
property: voluntarily44 conveying information to a third party

40Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,525 n.7 (1984);
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
41 The very subjectivity of the first prong and the unique "ownership" of proof (the
person asserting a Fourth Amendment right could always claim to have had an expectation
of privacy, and proof of a contrary mental state would be difficult) make it a less useful
test than the second prong. However, this emphasis on the second prong is not without its
critics. Professor Lafave argues that "[i]t would be a perversion of Katz to interpret it as
extending protection only to those who resort to extraordinary means to keep information
regarding their personal lives out of the hands of the police." WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(c) (4th ed. 2004).
Professor LaFave further argues that in the cyberworld "password protection, and perhaps
encryption of data should be no less reasonable than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar
alarms, even though each form of protection is penetrable." [d. § 2.6(f) (quoting Randolph
S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA.
L. REv. 1181, 1200 (1995». That view has been accepted by at least one lower court. See
United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F. Supp. 2d 117,121-23 (D. Mass. 2007).
42 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984).
43 Jd. at 176-81.
44 At least one district court has take.n an expansive view of "voluntary." In United
States v. Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006), the court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in home energy usage because the homeowner "voluntarily"
conveyed this information to the utility company by merely using the electricity.
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surrenders any expectation of privacy in the information. 45 Thus, if a
person voluntarily conveys information to a third party, the
government can obtain this information from the third party without
46
violating the conveying party's privacy interests.
The Supreme
Court upheld the use of pen registers to record outgoing telephone
numbers in Smith v. Maryland, because the telephone user
"voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone
company," exposing the information to the phone company's
47
equipment.
A district court has applied similar reasoning to
conclude that a homeowner had no reasonable privacy exp,ectation in
his or her home energy usage records because the homeowner
voluntarily conveyed this information to the utility company by
merely using the electricity.48 Similar reasoning also led the Ninth
Circuit to find no expectation of privacy in the address fields of e49
mails.
The issue of voluntary conveyance features prominently in the
application of the Fourth Amendment to trash.

45 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) ("[W]hen an individual reveals
private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that
information to the authorities .... Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy
occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now nonprivate
information."); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (noting that a bank
customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in records he voluntarily conveys to the
bank, such as deposit slips, because "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the infonnation will be conveyed by that person to the Government").
46 Even if the government obtains the information by violating the third party's privacy
interests, the person conveying the information has no standing to assert the third party's
claim. See generally Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Kerr, supra note 1, at 293-94.
47442 U.S. 735,744 (1979) ("When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that
the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
48 Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (rejecting an argument that electricity use records
revealed intimate facts about the home, making the action a search under Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001».
49 United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510-11 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit
found an expectation of privacy in the content of text messages. Quon v. Arch Wireless
Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008). One reading that reconciles these cases
is that content remains protected while the addr6ss information, analogous to an envelope,
is open to the public and not protected.
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II
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF TRASH

50
Trash has proven difficult to fit into Fourth Amendment analysis.
While the Fourth Amendment protects property within the curtilage,
and trash is typically placed at the edge of the curtilage in a container
protecting it from public view (suggesting protection under a
protected area analysis), it is also left with the expectation that a third
party will take possession of it, thereby calling into question the
reasonableness of any expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court addressed this conflict in California v.
Greenwood, where a search warrant was issued based on evidence
obtained from trash that the defendant had placed outside the curtilage
5
for removal. ! While the Court upheld the warrant, it rejected the
theory that the search of the trash was proper solely because the trash
had been abandoned,52 instead holding that trash was not protected by
the Fourth Amendment because there could be no objective
expectation of privacy-society would not consider it reasonable to
have a subjective expectation of privacy in trash. 53 The Court noted
that its conclusion was justified because "[i]t is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public"; the voluntary surrender of trash to a third
party (the garbage collector) renounces control over the property; and
the police need not avert their eyes from what is readily accessible to
the public and a third party.54
A contemporary review of the case summarizes its import:

50 For a compilation of cases reflecting the struggle, see LAFAVE, supra note 41, §
2.6(c).
51 486 U.S. 35, 38 (1988); For an analysis of Greenwood and cases involving trash, see
Kimberly 1. Winbush, Annotation, Searches and Seizures: Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Contents of Garbage or Trash Receptacle, 62 A.L.R.5th I (1998). For a
detailed analysis of Greenwood, critical of the decision, see Herdrich, supra note 10.
52 As a matter of general property law, abandonment of personal property relinquishes
ownership to any subsequent finder or, by escheat, to the state. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROP.: ABANDONMENT § 504 (1944).
53 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.

54Id. at 40-41 (footnotes omitted). The Greenwood Court later cited Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), for the proposition that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Prior to ... Katz v. United States, the [Fourth Amendment]
extended only to unauthorized physical intrusions . . . into a
"constitutionally protected area." Katz replaced this property-based
test with an amorphous inquiry into whether the intrusion violated a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." The new inquiry was twopronged, extending [Fourth Amendment] protection to those
interests in which a person manifests a subjective expectation of.
privacy that society recognizes as objectively reasonable .... Last
Term, in California v. Greenwood, the Court found an asserted
expectation of privacy in the contents of garbage bags left for
collection outside the curtilage to be unreasonable .... Greenwood
~her.efore. sta¥?s for the proposition that trash searches require no
JustificatIon.
Greenwood's focus on the expectation of privacy rather than
abandonment is surprising given the Court's repeated recognition of
Fourth Amendment protection for closed containers regardless of
location. 56 In dissent, Justice Brennan challenged the conclusion that
society would not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy
in trash, citing a local ordinance that appeared to protect the privacy
57
of trash in general and a century of cases protecting closed

55 Search and Seizure-Garbage Searches, 102 HARV. L. REv. 191, 191-99 (1988)
(footnotes omitted).
56 In container search cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that an
individual has an expectation of privacy in a sealed container regardless of its nature. See
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (stating that there is no distinction
between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428
(1981) (upholding an expectation of privacy in green opaque plastic wrapping); Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (finding an expectation of privacy in an unlocked
suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, II (1977) (recognizing an expectation of
privacy in a locked footlocker).
57 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 45-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Cheektowaga, New
York, ordinance made it "unlawful and a violation of this article for any person without
authority from the Town to collect, pick up, remove or cause to 'be collected, picked up or
removed any rubbish," CODE OF THE TOWN OF CHEEKTOWAGA, NEW YORK § 206-7(E)
(2005). Several states currently recognize privacy protection for trash under state
constitutional provisions: Hawaii (State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985));
Michigan (United States v. 987 Fisher Rd., 719 F. Supp. 1396, 1406-07 (E.D. Mich.
1989); MICH. CONST. art. I, § II); New Jersey (State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 799-804
(N.l 1990); N.J. CONST. art. I); New Mexico (State v. Granville, I42 P.3d 933, 944 (N.M.
Ct. App, 2006); N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 10); Oregon (State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040,
1049 (Or. 1988); OR. CONST. art. I, § 9); Vermont (State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 100 (Vt.
1996); VT. CONST. ch. I, art. XI); and Washington (State v. Hendrickson, 917 P.2d 563,
571 (Wash. 1996); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7). Indiana requires reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before police can conduct a trash-pull and also requires the police to
remove the garbage in the same manner as the collector. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d
356, 363-64 (Ind. 2005).
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containers.
In Justice Brennan's view, a garbage collector should
be treated like a bailee, whose possession of personal effects in closed
containers does not defeat the owner's Fourth Amendment right to
protect the contents of the container. 59
As Gordon MacDonald has observed,
Greenwood suggests at least three approaches to analyzing trash
cases, but fails to indicate which it ultimately regards as controlling.
The first ... was an application of Katz, under which the Court
concluded that the defendant's privacy expectations were
unreasonable. Second,... because the defendants "knowingly
exposed" their garbage, their privacy expectations were necessarily
defeated. Third, the Court, at least implicitly, endorsed a "bright
line" test under which no privacy expectations can attach to garbage
left outside the curtilage .... Two of the approaches ...-the bright
line and the knowing exposure tests-are inconsistent with a
faithful application of the other approach-the Katz expectation of
privacy test. The bright line test depends on the property based
concepts of abandonment and curtila e. Katz forcefully rejected
such property notions as controlling.,,6

8

The third of these approaches-the per se rule-is easiest to deal
with. Professor LaFave finds fault with the argument that trash is no
longer protected simply because it has been conveyed to the trash
collector; in his view, the conveyance "might support the conclusion
the police can enlist the aid of the garbage hauler ... but it hardly
means that the police may themselves intrude. There is no principle
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the effect that the police are
free to do what some individual has been authorized to dO.,,61 Lower
courts likewise appear troubled by a per se rule, focusing instead on
either the public accessibility/constitutionally protected area inquiry
or the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy inquiry.62

58 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 4~8 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23; Robbins, 453 U.S.
at 427; Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762 n.9; Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727,733 (1877».
59 Id. at 55 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
60 Gordon J. MacDonald, Note, Stray Katz: Is Shredded Trash Private?, 79 CORNELL
L. REv. 452, 469 (1994) (footnote omitted).

61 LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 2.6(c) (footnotes omitted). He further notes: "In coming
onto the curtilage and taking the trash, the collector is doing exactly what the householder
contemplated." Id. In most jurisdictions, methods of trash disposal are limited by law,
see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Criminal Law § 10-11O(c) (LexisNexis 2002), leaving few
options for protecting trash from searches.
62 United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2006) (no brightline rule for trash search cases); United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th Cir.
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Courts applying the "constitutionally protected area" test focus on
whether trash placed at a curbside is abandoned and therefore not
63
within the constitutionally protected area of the home. At least one
court has concluded, in the context of a civil dispute over ownership
of trash, that disposal of trash abandons neither the trash itself nor the'
expectation of privacy with respect to its contents. Sharpe v. Turl~
involved the ownership of documents produced in an earlier case. 4
In that case, plaintiffs attorney (Turley) had subpoenaed documents
that a nonparty (Sharpe) had taken from the defendant's trash
.
dumpster.
At the conclusion of the case, Turley turned the
documents over to the defendant rather than returning them to Sharpe,
and Sharpe sued, arguing that the documents had been abandoned by
66
the defendant and therefore Sharpe owned them. The court granted
summary judgment for Turley, holding that the documents had not
been abandoned and noting that the dumpster was on the defendant's
property and the defendant had contracted with a private party to
convey trash from the dumpster to a private landfil1. 67 This control
68
indicated that the defendant had not intended to abandon the trash.
Courts applying the "expectation of privacy" test focus on whether
one could have an expectation of privacy in trash that has been left by
the curb., Some state courts have found that the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy is enhanced by ordinances that prohibit
~

1991) (expectation of privacy must be evaluated notwithstanding intent to convey the
garbage to the garbage collector), Some cases appear to combine the two analyses, finding
that placing trash out for collection is abandonment and therefore inconsistent with an
expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. \972); Winbush, supra note
51. ("The vast majority of courts have ruled that when garbage is located in a place
accessible to the public, the individual who placed that garbage for collection either
abandoned it or has no reasonable expectation of privacy therein, thus rendering any
search and seizure of that trash lawful.").
63 See, e.g., United States v. Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that garbage placed outside for collection is abandoned property); Vahalik, 606 F.2d at 101
(holding that placing garbage' out for collection is abandonment, which terminates any
reasonable expectation of privacy); Mustone, 469 F.2d at 972 (expectation of privacy
inconsistent with abandonment). The concept of protected areas may be traced back to
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
64 191 S.W.3d 362, 364 (Tex. App. 2006) .
• 65 /d.
66 Id. at 366-67.
67 Id. at 368.
68Id.
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interference with trash containers,69 even though this argument was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Greenwood. 70 Some courts simply
reject the argument that merely intending to convey the garba~e to the
trash collector is enough to defeat an expectation of privacy, 1 while
others find that placing trash by the curb indicates intent to surrender
privacy even in the face of clear efforts to prevent disclosure. In
United States v. Kramer, the Seventh Circuit sustained an inside-thecurtilage search by holding that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to discarded garbage:
Of course people sometimes do not want others to see things--e.g.,
magazines, financial records, correspondence, doctor bills-that
they sometimes throwaway. But people can easily prevent this by
destroying what they want to keep secret before they discard it, or
by not discarding it. Defendant could have burned or shredded his
drug records before he d~carded them or kept them hidden
somewhere inside his house.

Many commentators likewise assumed that actions such' as
shredding would invoke Fourth Amendment protection against
warrantless searches of trash, and several courts have based rulings
upholding warrantless searches of trash on the argument that one
wishing to preserve privacy could have shredded documents prior to
·
. 0 f tern.
h
73
dIsposmg
However widely held, this assumption that shredding protects trash
from warrantless searches is not the law and, in fact, has been rejected
by the one circuit court that has ruled on the issue. In United States v.

69 See, e.g., State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 805 (N.J. 1990) (regulations against
garbage picking support expectation that garbage will remain private). But see Rikard v.
State, 123 S.W.3d 114, 121 (Ark. 2003) (city ordinances against garbage rummaging were
not created to give citizens an expectation of privacy in their garbage).
70 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Hedrick, 922 F.2d 396, 399 (7th CiT. 1991) ("The
Greenwood Court did not base its decision solely upon the conveyance of the garbage to
the collector."). Of course, once actually conveyed to the garbage collector, trash would
lose any privacy protection. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
72 711 F.2d 789, 792 (7th CiT. 1983) (emphasis added).
73 See, e.g., id.; United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 309 (2d Cir. 1983); State v.
DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 753 n.19 (Conn. 1993). More generally, in distinguishing
discarded trash from cord blood stem cells, one commentator noted, "If the owner of the
article, item, or material did not want it to be accessible to others, he or she could burn,
shred, or dispose of the trash in any number of other ways that would render the items
useless." Kimberly J. Cogdell, Saving the Leftovers: Models for Banking Cord Blood
Stem Cells, 39 U. MEM. L. REv. 229, 246 (2009).
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Scott, the court upheld a warrantless search, seizure, and
reconstruction of shredded documents that had been placed in the
defendant's trash, rejectinf, the argument that shredding demonstrated
an expectation of privacy. 4
The Scott trial court found persuasive authority for a reasonable
privacy interest in shredded documents 75 and met Greenwood's
observation that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags
left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to '
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the
public,,76 with its own observation that "it is not 'common
knowledge' that snoops and scavengers may retrieve shredded
materials and then 'painstakingly reconstruct' them to learn the
contents.,,77 On appeal, the First Circuit acknowledged, "The fact
that the abandoned property was partially destroyed by shredding ...
constitut[ed] evidence of [Scott's] subjective desire or hope that the
contents be unintelligible to third parties," but the court concluded
that this sUbjective desire "does not change the fact that it is as a
result of [Scott's] own actions that the shredded evidence was placed
in the public domain.,,78 "[I]mplicit in the concept of abandonment is
a renunciation of an~ reasonable expectation of privacy in the
property abandoned." 9 The First Circuit concluded that Scott
"discarded [his] garbage in an area particularly suited for public
inspection and consumption .... The Fourth Amendment ... does not
protect appellant when a third party expends the effort and expense to
solve the jigsaw puzzle created by shredding.,,8o
As Gordon MacDonald notes,

74 975 F:2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that because the "trash [was] left for
collection in a public place and over which its producer had relinquished possession," the
defendant also relinquished any expectation of privacy). Clearly, the court must have been
evaluating the privacy expectation from an objective perspective rather than the subjective
intent of the defendant. For a detailed analysis of the Scott case, see MacDonald, supra
note 60, at 452-56.
75 United States v. Scott, 776 F. Supp. 629, 632 (D. Mass. 1991) (citing Pleasant v.
Lovell, 876 F.2d 787,802 (lOth Cir. 1989».
76 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
77 Scott, 776 F. Supp. at 632.
78 Scott, 975 F.2d at 929.
79 [d. (quoting United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st CiT. 1972».
80 [d. at 930 ("At most, appellant's actions made it likely that most third parties would
decline to reconstitute the shredded remnants into a legible whole."); see also Cogdell,
supra note 73.
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The [court] was onto the right idea-that there are affirmative
privacy-seeking steps to protect an individual's interests even under
an abandonment analysis. Unfortunately, the court failed to carry
its reasoning to its logical conclusion. It is hard to conceive what
ac~, beYA>pd "mere" shredding, would evince an intent to retain
pnvacy.

III
IMMANENT TRASH, DISPOSAL IN GENERAL, AND CYBERTRASH

It is tempting to translate the trash cases into other areas where

property is discarded. The appeal is obvious, if superficial: all of the
cases deal with the consequences of a decision to dispose of property.
The natural tel1?-ptation to import the physical trash rules into the law
of cybertrash is amplified by the choice of a trash can as the icon for
file deletion in the ubiquitous Apple and Microsoft Windows
operating systems. Implicit in the argument for portability is the .
assumption that the disposal decision is the same in all cases. To
determine whether the physical trash cases appropriately translate to
cybertrash, it is helpful to analyze, as potential models, other areas
where the translation has been attempted, approaching the ultimate
question of the degree of protection afforded cybertrash by first
looking at how the degree of protection for discarded material in
general is determined, using the examples of immanent trash,
wastewater, and shed genetic material. With that background, it will
be possible to define trash in a relevant way and use that definition to
develo~ a generalized rule and apply it to cybertrash. As discussed
below, 2 the result is a dual rule, and one that separates cybertrash
from the other forms of disposal.
A. Potential Models and Problems in Translation
1. Immanent Trash

As discussed in detail above, the degree of protection afforded to
trash is unsettled and still in search of a clear theoretical basis.
Commentators,83 as well as the Greenwood Court itself,84 disagree on

81
82

MacDonald, supra note 60, at 488.
See infra Part III.B.

83 Compare Cogdell, supra note 73, at 245-46 ("Presumably, if one throws something
in the trash, the nature of its content is open to the public."), with Hope Lynne Karp, Note,
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the intent involved in disposal of trash, and the requisite level of
intent may well have changed over time. Greenwood would have
been an uncontroversial decision had the case arisen in the prior
century. As Professor Strasser notes,
[B]efore the twentieth century ... [o]bjects of no use to adults
became playthings for children. Broken or worn-out things could
be brought back to their makers, fixed by somebody handy, or taken
to people who specialized in repairs ... items beyond repair might
be dismantled, their parts reused or sold to junk men. This trade in
used goods amounted to a system for reuse and recycling . . .
scavenging was essential to that system, a chore and a common
pastime for poor children, who foraged for shreds of canvas or bits
of metal on the docks, for coal on the ra~~oad tracks, and for bottles
and food on the streets and in the alleys.

This system remained in place until the turn of the century, when
municipal sanitation workers did away with the need for "swill
children.,,86 Thus, it would have been unsurprising to conclude that
there was no expectation of privacy in trash in the nineteenth
century-the norm was that disposal of trash was intended to
surrender ownership to anyone who wanted to take possession. The
development of a system of public garbage collection and disposal did
not begin in the United States until the late-nineteenth century,87 and
as late as 1891 Scientific American reported, "There is probably not a
city of any size in the United States where the disposal of wastes is
satisfactory.,,88 However, by 1984,89 the norm was not only
formalized governmental pickup of trash, but in many states and

Trash: A Matter of Privacy?, 20 PACE L. REv. 541, 547 (2000) ("[The information
contained in trash] is conveyed to the garbage collector for the purpose of eliminating it
from one's life-forever.").
84 Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35-45 (1988), with id. at 45-56
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
85

SUSAN STRASSER, WASTE AND WANT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRASH 12, 13 (1998).

86

Id. at 13.

87 Martin V. Melosi, GARBAGE IN THE CITIES: REFUSE, REFORM, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 23 (rev. ed. 2005).
88 Disposal ofRefuse in American Cities, SCI. AM., Aug. 29, 1891, at 136.
89 The search of trash in Greenwood took place in April 1984, although the case did not
reach the Supreme Court unti11988. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37.
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municipalities, laws that forbade third parties to interfere with this
. 90
governmentaI fu nctIon.
Cybertrash has no such history. There was never a time when
owners of electronic files expected that others might take possession
of the files uninvited.

2. Wastewater
Wastewater is a broad category of material that is discarded. A
thread of search and seizure cases involving wastewater may help
clarify the uilderlying principles of disposal cases in general.
In Riverdale Mills v. Pimpare, Riverdale Mills discharged
wastewater into a municipal sewer system after pretreatment in its
91
private, on-site, treatment system.
The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) took samples from a manhole located in a public street
92
between the private treatment system and the municipal system.
Using reasoning similar to the argument that trash left at the curb for
pickup is no longer private, the court held that the EPA's sampling
did not violate Riverdale Mills' Fourth Amendment rights because the
wastewater had left Riverdale Mills' property and was "irretrievably"
flowing into the public sewer, where any member of the public could
. 93
sampI e It.
In United States v. Spain, the EPA sampled at the location where
94
Crown Chemical's sewer lines joined the public sewer system. · The
court held that this sampling did not constitute a search, citing
Riverdale and noting that "the facts of this case are even more
compelling ... because the EPA tested Crown's wastewater at the
exact point where that wastewater became public property.,,95
In United States v. Hajduk, the court applied the Riverdale
principle to hold that samples taken beyond the discharger's property
did not require a warrant, but those taken on the discharger's property
did, distinguishing between locations where the discharger had the

90 Elizabeth Gibson, Law Closes in on Bexley's Trash Man, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Jan. 19, 2009, http://ww:w.dispatch.comlcontentistories/locaV2009/01l19/trash_man. ART
_ART_ 01-19-09_BI_2ICJ3BA.html (last visited Aug. 5,2011).
91 392 F.3d 55,56-57 (1st Cir. 2004).
921d. at 58.
93 ld. at 64.
94

95

SIS F. Supp. 2d 860, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
ld. at 868.

20

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90, I

power to prevent flow to the public sewer and those where it did
not. 96
These cases appear to draw a line at the point where the waste
stream has been irrevocably committed to reaching an area from
which the public cannot be excluded. If this is the guiding principle,
then cybertrash should be safe. Notwithstanding its location beyond
the physical boundary of the house, and notwithstanding its
accessibility by third parties, it is not accessible to the public.
3. ShedDNA

If the term "discarded" is viewed broadly, then another category of
routinely discarded material is DNA that is constantly shed in the
form of hair and skin cells. "[W]e can't go anywhere ... without
leaving a bread-crumb trail of identifying DNA matter.,,97 Judge
Kozinski, dissenting in United States v. Kincade, warned, "If we have
no legitimate expectation of privacy in such bodily material, what
possible impediment can there be to having the government collect
what we leave behind, extract its DNA signature and enhance CODIS
to include everyone?,,98 Yet DNA is routinely collected from crime
scenes without raising Fourth Amendment issues, and collecting this
99
"abandoned" DNA has been held not to require a warrant.
Courts
have also approved warrantless collection of DNA samples obtained
by police who retrieved them from items deliberately given to
100
suspects.
Whether there is a general rule equating shed DNA with trash (and
therefore exposing it to warrahtless search and seizure) is as yet
undecided. A number of states have enacted legislation protecting
DNA as property,101 but in the absence of specific legislation, the law

96

396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1226-27 (D. Colo. 2005).
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
97

98Id.
99 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Kincade, 370 F.3d at 819; State v.
Perry, 502 So. 2d 543,556-57 (La. 1986).
100 See People v. Ayler, 799 N.y'S.2d 162, *5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (denying motion
to suppress evidence obtained from DNA on cigarettes offered to defendant during a
police interview); Richard Willing, Police Dupe Suspects into Giving up DNA, USA
TODAY, Sept. 11,2003, at A3; Richard Willing, As Police Rely More on DNA. States Take
a Closer Look, USA TODAY, June 6, 2000, at IA.
101 See ALASKA STAT. § 18. I 3.010(a)(2) (2004) ("[A] DNA sample and the results ofa
DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled
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of ownership and control of DNA is unsettled. A federal district court
dismissed a complaint claiming ownership of tissue that had been
donated for research purposes but then used for additional
commercial purposes, because "the property right in blood and tissue
samples also evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a
third party.,,102
In arguing for restrictions on the collection of abandoned DNA,
Elizabeth Joh observes that "legal discussion is hampered by a
misleading analogy between abandoned DNA and garbage" and that
arialysis of rights in DNA "should address the question of whether
more a~frop!iate analogies to abandoned DNA exist other than
trash.,,1 Joh notes an important distinction:
Courts may readily find that criminals have clearly intended to
renounce all privacy claims to bags containing illegal firearms or to
packages of drug paraphernalia when fleeing the police, but we
hardly have a realistic choice in shedding DNA. One can shred
private papers or bum garbage so that no one may ever deJxe into
them, but leaving DNA in public places cannot be avoided. I

Such an argument would apply to cybertrash as well. It is
impossible to create electronic files without leaving traces-if not in
public places, at least in places where the owner does not maintain
absolute control. Files created in cyberspace are typically subject to
backup procedures that are beyond the owner's control and which
create copies that persist for a significant period of time after the
.. 1 105
.
owner d e1etes th e ongma.

or analyzed."); COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (2009) ("Genetic information is the
unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains."); FLA. STAT. §
760.40(2)(a) (2009) ("[Genetic testing results] are the exclusive property of the person
tested."); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1) (1995) ("Genetic information is the unique
property of the individual tested."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22: 1023(E) (2009) (describing
genetic information as "property" of the person tested); OR. REv. STAT. 192.537(1) (2009)
("[A]n individual's genetic information and DNA sample are private and must be
protected, and an individual has a right to the protection of that privacy.").
102 Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research lnst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1075
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
.
\03 Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857, 860, 862 (2006).
104 [d. at 867 (footnote omitted).
105 For an example of the propagation of backup copies and the time taken to remove
them, see Rajen Sheth, Disaster Recovery by Goog/e, OFFICIAL GOOGLE ENTERPRISE
BLOG (Mar. 4, 2010), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.coml2010/03/disaster-recovery-by
-google.html, which outlines Google's backup procedures.
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4. Cybertrash

A troubling argument by analogy' to physical trash runs as follows:
Imagine that an individual receives an e-mail and, as many
individuals do, prints a copy. The next day, the individual deletes the
e-mail and places the printout in the trash can and places the trash can
at the curb for disposal by the municipal trash collector. Under
Greenwood, the printout may be retrieved without a warrant. .Why,
the argument would continue, should a warrant be required for one
form of trash but not the other?
One subissue can be disposed of easily. Storage of the deleted file
at a common facility (the individual's e-mail provider or Internet
service provider) should be irrelevant. Courts have recognized that
Fourth Amendment protection can exist in common areas .such as
those found within apartment complexes, hotels, and motels. 106
Resolving the main issue, however, requires analysis of the nature
of cybertrash.
Cybertrash is data-files, applications, and
communications~reated in cyberspace and then deleted.
The
volume of cyberspace data has increased dramatically with the
introduction of the concept of "cloud computing": applications and
data stored online and accessible remotely on what is known as a
l07
cloud platform.
Because the applications and data are stored
online, a user can access them from anywhere with an Internet
connection. Cloud platforms are offered by IBM,108 Google,109 and
.
110
III
MICrosoft, among others.

106 See, e.g., United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709,716-17 (9th Cir. 1976) (common
hallway of an apartment building); United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir.
1976) (common area of an apartment building); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484
(5th Cir. 1974) (fenced yard of a multiunit apartment building). But see United States v.
Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1985) (no expectation of priva~y in common
hallway or lobby of apartment building).
107 Rebooting Their Systems, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12,2011, at 73, 73.
108 IBMSmartCloud, IBM, http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/cloudlindex.html(last
visited Aug. 5,2011).
109 Kate Greene, Google's Cloud Looms Large, TECH. REv. (Dec. 3, 2007),
http://www.technologyreview.com/BiztechlI9785I?a=f(last visited Aug. 5, 2011).
110 Cloud Power, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloudldefault.aspx (last
visited Aug. 5, 2011).
III See, e.g., Alex Williams, A Bursting Market: Cisco Building APls for Cloud
Infrastructure Automation, READWRITE, (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://www
.readwriteweb.com/cloudl2011/03/cisco-building-apis-for-cloud.php.
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When data is placed on a cloud platform, it is typically maintained
by a third party, with the maintenance including storage at mirror sites
and regular backups of the data to protect against 10SS.112 The owner
of the data can remotely issue an instruction to delete the data, but
deletion does not result in destruction. 113 Initially, it is merely an
instruction to make the physical space on which the data is stored
available for reuse, and until the space is reused, the data remains
intact. 114 Furthermore, servers do not typically delete the files on
115
Again,
backups, but rather periodically recycle the backup media.
until the media is actually reused, the data remains intact. 116
This leads to a further complication when dealing with cybertrash:
the question of when and where cybertrash disposal takes place.
Cybertrash is not physically stored at the owner's location, and while
the owner may retain legal control over the information, it is control
by virtue of contractual agreements and passwords. 117 Furthermore,
the entity that has physical control over the facilities where the
information is stored typically will maintain mirror sites against the
possibility of power failures, fires, or other disasters and make backup
copies that are stored off_site. 118 The owner's instruction to delete a

Rebooting Their Systems, supra note 107.
See SIMSON GARFINKEL, GENE SPAFFORD & ALAN SCHWARTZ, PRACTICAL UNIX
AND INTERNET SECURITY 678 (3d ed. 2003) ("When a file is deleted, the contents are not
immediately overwritten. Instead, the data records are added back into the freelist on disk.
If they are not reused yet ... you can still read the contents."). For an example of a cloud
storage and backup policy, see the Google policy, supra note 105.
114 Deleted Files Can Be Recovered, AKDART.COM, http://www.akdart.com/priv9.html
(last visited Aug. 5, 20 II).
115 Id.
112

1)3

116

See, e.g., id.

The physical facility operates as the agent for the owner of the data and would have
a fiduciary duty to follow the owner's instructions as to disposal. Mere encryption' has
been held insufficient to establish the requisite expectation of privacy to invoke Fourth
Amendment protection, and the refusal to recognize shredding as evidencing a sufficient
expectation of privacy in United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927,929 (1st Cir. 1992), would
provide a powerful analogy to support warrantless decryption or cracking of passwords.
See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
118 See GARFINKEL, SPAFFORD & SCHWARTZ, supra note 113, at 551-52.
I 17

It may take a week or a month to realize that a file has been deleted. Therefore,
you should keep some backup tapes for a week, some for a month, and some for
several months. Many organizations. make yearly or quarterly backups' that they
archive indefinitely. After all, tape is cheap. Some organizations decide to keep
their yearly or biannual backups 'forever'-it's a small investment in the event
that they should ever be needed again.
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file must ~ropagate through this system to affect all of these
locations. 1 I
To understand why, notwithstanding the appeal of a single rule for
all discarded property, cybertrash rules should not be the same as
immanent trash rules requires exploration of a seemingly trivial
question: What is trash?
B. What Is Trash?
Greenwood and its progeny do not attempt to define trash-they
begin their analysis with the proposition that the items of interest are
"trash" and then analyze where the trash was left and what
expectations the prior owner and society in general might have had
regarding its disposition. In the immanent world, the lack of
definition is unimportant, and intuitive definitions are quite
satisfactory and rarely raise issues. As valuable property moves from
the tangible world to the intangible, and especially as intangible
property moves from local embodiments l20 to the "cloud," the
definition of trash and the rights of "trashholders" become important.
For something that is so ubiquitous, trash is remarkably undefined.
There is no absolute right to create trash. The right must arise as
inherent in the notion of property, which includes the right of
alienation. However, neither the right to destroyl21 nor the right to

Id.; see also Google policy, supra note 105.
119 Even files on one's own computer may not be under the owner's complete control, .
depending on the operating system. Most operating systems can be set to create automatic
backup files, and most operating systems create system files that are hidden from the user
and carry out functions such' as creating page files to speed up access and display or
creating system images that are stored on the hard drive as "hibernate" files when system
power falls below a specified level. Many programs also automatically create files that
facilitate their functioning without direct request by the user-for example, Internet
cookies.
120 Examples of local tangible embodiments of intangible property include data saved
on a disk drive and music stored on a CD or MP3 player. The tangible embodiment and
the intangible property (in this case a copyright) are distinct properties. See generally 17
V.S.c. § 1001 (2006).
121 See generally 17 V.s.c. § 106A (2006) (prohibiting the destruction of certain works
of art).
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dispose Of122 are absolute attributes of physical property, even in the
absence of third-party rights. 123
There are several ways to categorize trash: biodegradable or not,
recyclable or not, usable or not, hazardous or not. In the physical
world, these categories matter, and limitations on how trash may be
124
In
disposed of are imposed by statute based on these distinctions.
the nonphysical world of cybertrash, only one of these distinctions
matters.
All cybertrash is biodegradable, recyclable, and
nonhazardous. The critical division is between cybertrash that might
be used by others and that which might not. To understand why this
distinction matters in cyberspace, consider the reasons that people
dispose of trash.
Conceptually, there are two broad categories of trash disposal:
disposal that is meant merely to part with ownership and possession,
and disposal that is meant to destroy the discarded trash. While Katz
holds that the trash owner's subjective intent is insufficient to invoke
Fourth Amendment protection, that intent is still relevant. In the
physical world it is relevant because Katz requires a. subjective intent
to maintain privacy in addition to an expectation of privacy that
society deems objectively reasonable; 125 in the cyber world, it is
determinative.
1. Trash as a Surrender of Ownership

An example of trash disposal falling into the "surrender" category
would be. a discarded old newspaper. The owner of the old
newspaper finds no further value in the property and simply wants to
part with possession and, in the process of doing so, is also willing to
part with ownership--the owner does not care if someone else sees
value in the discarded newspaper and wishes to take possession and
ownership. Similarly, if a lamp breaks and the owner does not value
it sufficiently to repair it, and instead places it by the' curb for trash
pickup, the owner typically would not object if a passerby saw

122 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006) (prohibiting disposal of certain substances
without a permit and compliance with government-set requirements).
123 The existence of third-party rights can, of course, limit the right to destroy or
dispose of property that one owns. Examples of categories of third-party rights are liens,
co-ownerships, and leases.
124 See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 6901 (2006).
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). See generally supra Part I.C.;
Couillard, supra note 2.
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sufficient value in the broken lamp and took possession and
ownership in order to repair it. Case law is consistent with this
general presumption and generally treats trash as abandoned property
open to apRropriation by others (including government
investigators), 6 either by virtue of abandonment under the trespass
theory 127 or surrender under the expectation of privacy theory. 128
As discussed above, voluntarily conveying information to a third
party surrenders the right to claim Fourth Amendment protection for
129
the information.
While Justice Brennan criticized reliance on
abandonment as a rationale for depriving trash of Fourth Amendment
protection, it is one of the rationales offered by the Court in
California v. Greenwood,130 and if cybertrash is viewed as a disposal
of ownership and possession, it is a rationale that would lead to the
conclusion that cybertrash may be searched without a warrant.
2. Trash as an Instruction to Destroy

There is a second category of disposal, where the intent is not to
release possession and ownership but rather to destroy the discarded
item so that no one may own it. Disposal of personal documents
would usually fall into this category.
The wastewater cases and, inherently, the physical trash cases,
highlight an important second aspect of disposal: destruction of the
link between the disposed property and its former owner. The
wastewater cases illustrate one reason why it is important: when the
link is broken, so is the evidentiary value of the property. Likewise,

126 See. e.g., United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1111-12 (7th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Walker, 624 F. Supp. 99, 101-02 (D. Md. 1985); Rikard v. State, 123 S.W.3d
114, 119-20 (Ark. 2003); People v. Rooney, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53-54 (1985); People v.
H\lddleston, 347 N.E.2d 76,80-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); State v. Sampson, 765 A.2d 629,
635 (Md. 2001).
127 See supra Part LB.
128 See supra Part LC.

129 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1984) (package delivered to a
private carrier); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979) (telephone numbers
called); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (bank records); United States v.
Hamilton, 434 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (D. Or. 2006) (electricity records); see also supra
notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
130 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 49 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
Justice Brennan noted, "Of 11 Federal Court of Appeals cases cited by the Court ... 7 rely
entirely or almost entirely on an abandonment theory that ... the Court has discredited."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Sampson, 765 A.2d at 634 (noting that the trash cases are
based less on the property concept of abandonment than on public accessibility).
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the reason for seizing trash befote'it is mixed with others' trash is to
preserve its evidentiary link to a particular individual or individuals.
Thus, where the intent associated with disposal is to destroy, it may
evidence either the intent to physically destroy or simply the intent to
destroy the one-to-one link between the physical object and its owner.
Either is evidence of intent to maintain privacy and therefore satisfies
Katz and the first prong of the Greenwood test.
IV
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF CYBERTRASH

A. Encryption and the Curtilage
There are two arguments in favor of protection of deleted files that,
under current theory, do not appear to be sufficient to establish Fourth
Amendment protection.
One appealing argument is that the information is private. 131
Transmission from and to the owner is typically encrypted. 132 The
argument has even been accepted in dissent that there is a general
133
expectation of privacy in trash in genera1.
However, at least under
the current "objective expectation of privacy" standard, this argument
would not be sufficient. Even shredding trash has been held

131 In most cases the information would meet the Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition
of trade secret information. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
The Act provides that a trade secret is created when confidential information is subject to
reasonable steps to protect its confidentiality. Id. Password protection and encryption, in
most cases, are considered reasonable steps to maintain confidentiality. See, e.g., Optos,
Inc. v. Topcon Med. Sys., Inc., No. 10-12016-DJC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22263, at *5253 (D. Mass. 2011); I-Systems, Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. 01-1951, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6001, at *46-47 (D. Minn. 2004).
132 Sensitive information may be transferred using SSL (secure socket layer) or SHTTP
(secure HTTP) protocols. Data may also be encrypted prior to transmission using widely
available encryption software.
133 See State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 757-58 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J., dissenting).
Justice Katz argued,

The majority suggests ... that it is also reasonable for society to expect citizens
to take affirmative steps-such as shredding or destroying-to hide garbage that
they wish to keep private. How many of us, as Connecticut residents, feel the
need to shred or destroy personal information before discarding it in order to
protect its confidentiality? The very fact that Connecticut residents customarily
discard highly personal and typically confidential information into their garbage
without first shredding or destroying it, is a strong indication that they expect
these items to remain private.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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insufficient to establish an objective expectation of privacy,134 and
while encryption might delay interpretation of the data,135 it does not
136
suffice to prevent its seizure and attempt to interpret it.
A second appealing approach is to update the definition of the
curtilage so as to consider data stored off-site but accessible through
the Internet as part of the area immediately surrounding the home, in
137
effect bringing the ISP within the curtilage.
This approach was at
least implicitly rejected in Smith v. Maryland. 138 While the focus of
the case was on the absence. of an expectation of privacy in
information (the telephone numbers dialed by the defendant)
conveyed to a third party (the phone company),139 the information
was being sent over equipment that at least in part was located in the
defendant's home and all of which was connected to the defendant's
home. In United States v. Forrester, a federal circuit court relied on

See United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1992).
Shredc;ling certainly must have delayed interpretation of the documents seized in
Scott. See supra notes 74-81 and accompal)ying text.
136 Kerr, supra note I, at 532 (traditional view that encryption does not create
reasonable expectation of privacy applies to the Internet). David Couillard argues that
Kerr misses the point: encryption should not be analogized to a physical lock and key but
rather to opacity. Couillard, supra note 2, at 2226.
134

135

Hypothetically, if a briefcase is locked with a combination lock, the government
could attempt to guess the combination until the briefcase unlocked; but because
the briefcase is opaque, there is still a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
unlocked container. In the context of virtual containers in the cloud, however,
encryption is not simply a virtual lock and key; it is virtual opacity.
Id. More generally, attempts to hide information have been held insufficient in several
aerial surveillance cases where the information was successfully hidden from ground-level
view. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450--51 (1989) (visible by helicopter);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, fW9, 214 (1986) (visible by plane flying above a yard
enclosed by a ten-foot fence).
137 See Couillard, supra note 2; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1928) (protecting the new technology of personal telephone conversations). Although
decided after Smith v. Mary/and, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), Oliver v. United States sets forth
the traditional understanding of curtilage: "the area around the home to which the activity
of home life extends." 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). Subsequently, the Court defined
the curtilage as the area "so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under
the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294,.30 I (1987). As discussed above, the Dunn defmition is circular and does not compel
a different result.
138 See 442 U.S. 735.
139 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 ("[P]etitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to
the telephone company .... In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.").
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Smith to distinguish between the address fields in e-mails and the
content of e-mail messages, holding that e-mailers "have no
expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages ...
because they should know that this infonnation is provided to and
used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing
the routing of infonnation.,,14o These cases may be seen as
applications of the more general principal announced in Horton v.
California: there is a distinction between a container and its contents,
and exposure of the container to the public does not surrender the
.
pnvacy
0 f the contents. 141
These cases may provide support for an argument establishing an
expectation of privacy, but they appear to reject the concept of an
expanded curtilage.
Furthennore, basing Fourth Amendment
protection on a redefinition of curtilage would require a retreat from
the Katz expectation of privacy theory to the earlier physical trespass
theory.
B. The Presumption of Destruction and Objective Expectations

While the relatively low percentage of personal documents in
physical trash may support Greenwood's conclusion that the default
with respect to the physical world is an intent to--or at least
indifference to-transfer, it is likely that the reverse is true in
cyberspace. There, most cybertrash consists of files containing
personal or private infonnation, so the reasonable conclusion would
be that the default assumption should be that disposal reflects an
intent to destroy. For example, the default objective of "trashing" emails and files is more likely to be a desire to destroy rather than
abandon. The reasons are simple: cyberproperty takes little physical
space, so the incentive to dispose of it to make room is less pressing
than with physical property. Cyberproperty does not decay, so the
incentive to dispose of it to avoid having it spoil is not present. The
reason for deleting a file is nonnally to make it disappear, not to
transfer ownership, much less to make it available to the general
public, and even less to transfer ownership to a third party who could
., I owner. 142
th en deny access to th e ongma

United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500,510 (9th Cir. 2008).
496 U.S. 128, 141 n.ll (1990) (mere seizure of container does not of itself authorize
opening it without a warrant).
142 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 222 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980).
140
141
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It was therefore reasonable for the Katz Court to impose the dual

requirements of sUbjective expectation of privacy and objective
societal recognition of the claim to privacy, because there were two
possible answers to the inquiry, what did the owner expect? It was
defensible for the Greenwood Court to conclude that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no Fourth
Amendment protection, with respect to physical trash, because it was
possible to conclude that trash left unprotected in the open might not
be considered private. In a world where there can be no question as
to expectations and no ambiguity as to intent, neither result could be
defended. The cyberworld is such a world.
The ambiguity of immanent trash disposal does not arise with
respect to cybertrash. One would not expect "animals, small children
and scavengers" to rummage through cybertrash in search of
something edible or reusable. It is hard to imagine that an owner's
choice to delete information was meant to release the information for
possible reuse by someone else-the intent is always to make the
information disappear. 143
Nor could the second prong of the two-part test announced in Katz
and apparently the critical inquiry regarding Fourth Amendment
protection for trash-the societal acceptance of an expectation of
privacy-be in doubt. Few issues in cyberspace have attracted as
much attention as the risk of identity theftl44 and the related issue of
145
government access to private information.
Protection against
spyware is a billion-dollar-a-year industry; hundreds of articles appear
annually in the popular press; the fTC website offers tips for avoiding
identity theft. If society. were prepared to accept as reasonable an
expectation of privacy in anything, online personal information would
have to be at or near the top of the list. This concern over online

143 If the intent were to make the information available for use by others, it would be emailed or posted on a website, not deleted.
144 See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce, and Privacy:
The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. LJ.
SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011); Mark MacCarthy, Information Security Policy in the u.s. Retail
Payments Industry, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3; Gary M. Victor, identity Theft, Its
Environment and Proposals for Change, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 273 (2006).
145 See, e.g., James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1459 (2004); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free
Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National Security
Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1105 (2009); Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the
Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145 (2008).
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identity theft, and the resulting expectation that online transactions
remain private, distinguishes cybertrash from Greenwood. Given the
scope of concern 146 and resulting federal legislation,147 it would be
difficult to argue that society did not recognize as reasonable an
expectation of privacy in electronic records and an expectation that
deleting such records would result in continued privacy.
CONCLUSION: PROTECTING CYBERTRASH

The entire problem of the status of cybertrash may have arisen
simply because some unnamed software engineer on Apple's Lisa
development project decided to use a stylized trash can as the GUI
symbol for "deleted files,,,148 but it is more likely that, regardless of
the name chosen for the area in which deleted files are stored, the
analogy to physical trash would have been advanced eventually. In
both the physical and cyber cases, the intent is to part with ownership
or control of something. There are, however, two critical distinctions
that should make the application of the immanent trash decisions to
cybertrash lead to a conclusion that Fourth Amendment protections
apply: there is no ambiguity in the action of deleting a file, and there
is no question about the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy
.
.
fil 149
In pnvate 1 es.
Together, these distinctions should place deleted electronic
information squarely in the protected category under Greenwood and
therefore subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections as other

146 See, e.g., Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.comJinfo/identity-theftl
(last visited Aug. 5, 2011); Stephanie Annour, Employment Records Prove Ripe Source
for Identity Theft, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.usatoday.comJmoney
Iworkplace/2003-01-23-idtheft-cover_x.htm (last visited Aug. 5,2011); see also IDENTITY
THEFT NEWS ARTICLES, http://ssnfraudinfo.blogspot.comJ (last visited Aug. 5,2011).
147 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(4) (2006).
148 As discussed above, even the term "delete" does not mean "dispose or'-it means
mark the physical space on which the information is stored as available for reuse. The
information is not disposed of until space is needed and the informati9n is overwritten.
This so-called slack space can be specifically selected and overwritten by specialized
programs, known as file scrubbers, that offer various levels of destruction of the
underlying data. These can be used on systems the owner of the information controls but
not on systems under a third party's control.
149 A different result would of course be expected where the expectation of privacy was
surrendered, as in the case of published files, such as those posted on Facebook or a
similar website or those e-mailed to third parties. Nonconfidential disclosure to a third
party surrenders the claim to an expectation of privacy. See supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
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personal data. The result is constitutionally compelled and does not
depend on any statute. Thus, there· is no need for a new statute to
extend privacy protection to cybertrash, and it is beyond Congress'
power to diminish this protection.
There are, however, steps that are advisable to protect cybertrash.
There is a theoretical risk of a bootstrap trap--merely announcing that
there is no privacy in cybertrash would allow a government agency to
argue that there could thereafter be no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy based on the rationale in Greenwood. Justice
Brennan's conjecture that "members of our society will be shocked to
learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems
unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that
are concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public,,15o was the
minority view. This argument would, however, completely destroy
the Fourth Amendment. If accepted, it would allow the government
to search any location simply by announcing ahead of time that it
intended to do so.
The abandonment theory still seems viable, at least in the context
151
Therefore, care must be taken to do nothing that might be
ofDNA.
construed as making the information public or abandoning deleted
files.
Thus, files posted in public places-Facebook, LinkedIn, company
websites, and the like--do not obtain protection by being deleted. A
more subtle risk may be posed by form contracts with· ISPs, websites,
e-mail services, or employers that purport to transfer ownership of
some or all of the rights in the files. Because information shared with
a third party who is not under a duty of confidentiality surrenders the
expectation of privacy necessary to assert Fourth Amendment
protection,152 these contracts may terminate Fourth Amendment
rights in any files they cover, and again, the protection is not restored
by virtue of deletion.
In the absence of these or similar affirmative acts of surrender,
cybertrash should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.

150 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,46 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151

See Joh, supra note 103.

152

See sources cited supra note 46 and accompanying text.

